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ABSTRACT 
 
This article approaches the risk perception towards the 
Brazilian telecommunications sector and how it might 
affect the flow of data driven investment in the country. 
Empirical evaluations are carried out with risk assessment 
metrics, Value at Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value at Risk 
(CoVaR), for a sample of telecommunications companies.  
Such approach is complemented by a descriptive review of 
the sector´s potential sources of risk and contagion 
channels.  Results present own risk for each company in the 
sample and their individual contribution to the systemic 
risk in the sector. Besides, findings suggest that systemic 
risk perception might play an important role on investors´ 
decision to invest in the telecommunications sector in 
Brazil. Final remarks include notes on the potential benefits 
of adopting risk metrics as a tool to improve governance in 
the sector. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Risk and systemic risk assessment of non-financial sectors 
is an incipient practice in Brazil. Nevertheless, recent 
initiatives carried out by regulatory agencies, market 
analysts and investors have sponsored the expansion of 
these mechanisms in search of improving the sector’s 
governance and towards better regulation design. 
Such an approach is coherent with the ongoing debate about 
risk exposure of non-financial regulated sectors. The 
telecommunications sector in Brazil is particularly suitable 
to this debate since it is susceptible to market, operational 
and compliance risks, as well as the idiosyncrasies of a 
coexisting public and private regimes. Besides, the sector is 
highly dependent on third party capital for infrastructure 
modernization. 
This study intends to provide an assessment of own 
individual risk of companies and their contribution to the 
systemic risk of the entire telecommunications sector.  
Complementarily, it suggests inputs for the design of 
prudential mechanisms toward risk mitigation in the sector. 
For the purpose of conceptualizing, systemic risk is defined 
as the susceptibility of a macro shock that produces nearly 
simultaneous, large, adverse effects in a sector or all of the 
domestic economy or even international system [1,2]. It can 
also refer to the risk of a chain reaction within 
interconnected agents or a type of spillover that involves 
weaker and more indirect connections [2]. According to 
OECD [1], highly complex and interdependent large-scale 
technical systems are particularly susceptible to change that 
poses risks to themselves while also causing disruptions 
thorough cascading effects.  
For the purpose of empirical analysis authors estimate risk 
assessment indicators such as Value at Risk (VaR) and 
Conditional Risk Value (CoVaR) with quantile regression 
method. These indicators allow estimating the probability 
of loss of individual return of companies, given a certain 
confidence interval, and the effect of the performance of a 
given institution on the aggregate risk of the sector, 
respectively. 
References for the analysis are set on observations for a 
sample of telecommunications companies that have their 
shares traded in the stock market and that operate 
simultaneously in retail and wholesale infrastructures 
markets. These institutions are distinguished by high degree 
of vertical integration and irrefutable interconnection within 
the sector and with other sectors of the economy [3]. 
An axiom that guides the development of this study is the 
nexus between the investor's perception of risk and their 
propensity to invest. Such cause and effect relation along 
with the oddities of the Brazilian telecommunications sector 
will be better detailed throughout the study. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the 
context in which the telecommunications sector operates 
and highlights the degree of sectoral interconnection. 
Section 3 describes the methodological aspects and the data 
base statistics. Section 4 presents the results and 
distinguishes the institutions with higher own risk and their 
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contribution to the sector’s systemic risk perception. 
Concluding remarks contains proposals for prudential 
measures. 
 
 
2. “TOO INTERCONECTED TO FAIL”: NOTES ON 
RISK SOURCES AND CONTAGION CHANNELS IN 
THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
 
An appraisal of intensity and scope of systemic risk in the 
telecommunications sector requires a preliminary 
understanding about the sector´s main risk sources and the 
channels of contagion spread. 
Regarding the sources of risk, authors have highlighted the 
market, the compliance obligations and the specificities of 
the telecommunications industry as the leading factors 
[4,5]. Market risk embodies the inherent dynamics of 
services supply and demand in a competitive environment. 
This relation is particularly affected by boundless 
applications developed within the ongoing technology 
revolution which latest phenomenon is the dissemination of 
internet based solutions that has among other features 
contributed to substitute those provided by conventional 
telecommunications companies. 
By its turn, the so-called compliance costs refer to the 
regulatory and legal obligations to comply with certain 
standards of conduct. The guarantees of service provision 
continuity and the obligation for high standard 
universalization of legacy services are remarkable examples 
of hyper regulation in the sector. Particularly, the obligation 
of continuity has become a major source of risk perception 
in the sector due to its linkage with moral hazard behaviors 
by companies that would ultimately increase its exposure to 
risk facing the expectation of government support in 
eventual continuity failure. 
Still in the compliance spectrum it is noteworthy that 
services offered through the Internet presupposes greater 
freedom of offer and fewer incidence of fiscal and 
regulatory costs, typical of the conventional operators. 
Finally, there are technical matters affected to the operation 
of the sector. One issue within this spectrum is the 
considerable claim for infrastructure modernization in order 
to cope with the intensive data use demand. Such a demand 
imposes higher reliance on third-party investors due to 
capital intensive investments. 
 
2.1. Opus Reticulatum: the level of interconnection of the 
telecommunications industry in Brazil 
 
As for the means of risk propagation, it might be 
recognized the high degree of network interconnection 
between telecommunications companies and between them 
and other economic agents. Communications infrastructures 
are the backbone for the entire economy functioning and its 
availability is essential for the economy to prosper. 
Following figure 1 partially illustrates the extent of the 
interdependencies between the communications and other 
utilities and relevant services sectors. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Interdependencies of the communications 
architecture. Source: [6] 
 
Consistent networks serve as a communication and 
transaction platform for the entire economy and are 
correlated to higher standards of productivity across all 
sectors as well as source of innovative ecosystems and to 
support economic growth [7].  
 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
For the purpose of empirical evaluation this study is set on 
the combination of two complementary metrics commonly 
used as risk indicators from the investor's perspective. The 
first is the Value at Risk (VaR) which purpose is to asses 
the individual risk of companies in a given sample. The 
second is a derivate of the first and is referred to as Value at 
Conditional Risk (CoVaR) and aims at measuring the 
systemic risk of the sector. 
VaR is a univariate risk metric that allows the identification 
of the probability of performance losses during a given 
period, given a confidence interval. By its turn, the CoVaR 
represents the Value at Risk of a broader group of 
institutions, conditioned to the performance of an given 
institution under stress. 
Taking as basis the CoVaR authors have conceived the 
ΔCoVaR which purpose is to assess the systemic risk, 
calculated by the difference between the CoVaR 
conditioned to a certain stress institution and the CoVaR of 
the institution in its median state [8]. This approach is used 
experimentally in this study, since there is no settled 
consensus about preferential methodology for assessing the 
systemic risk of non-financial sector. 
 
3.1. Application of VaR and CoVar in the context of 
telecommunications industry 
 
To the purpose of quantification of VaR and CoVaR 
authors have systematically relied upon quantile regression 
[8,9,10]. This array allows for estimating individual risk for 
each of the companies in a selected sample and the 
systemic risk for the overall sector.  
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In algebraic terms the VaR of an institution i at a given 
percentile q is defined by: 
[equation 1] 
 
𝑃𝑟(𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖 ) = 𝑞 
 
With 𝑋𝑖 indicating the performance of institution i, 
represented in this study by the daily variation of the 
market value for which the 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖  is defined. Given the 
characteristics of 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖 , and the quantile, its value is 
typically negative. In other words, the returns correspond to 
the left hand side of the results distribution. 
By its turn, the CoVaR relates two parts - on the one hand 
the performance of the sector and, on the other, the 
individual results of a given institution. Thus, 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
 
might represent the VaR of the system that makes up the 
telecommunications sector j, conditional on an event ℂ(𝑋𝑖) 
of a single institution i. Thus, 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
 is implicitly 
defined by the quantile q of the conditional probability 
distribution: 
 
[equation 2] 
 
𝑃𝑟 (𝑋𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑗|ℂ(𝑋𝑖)
| ℂ(𝑋𝑖)) = 𝑞 
 
To capture the temporal variations in the joint distribution 
of 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚, authors have relied on state variables. A 
state variable is a vector used to describe the natural 
dynamism of the financial market, independent of the effect 
forces of a particular institution [9]. For the purpose of this 
study the return of the BOVESPA Index (IBOV), 
represented in the model with the lagged expression 𝑀𝑡−1, 
was chosen as state variable.  
The quantile regression, with daily observations and 
quantile q = 5%, is estimated with the following equations: 
 
[equation 3] 
𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 
 
𝑋𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = 𝛼𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑋𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1
+ 𝜀𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
 
 
The returning coefficients are input for setting the 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) 
and 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) indicators in the following terms: 
 
[equation 4] 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) = ?̂?𝑞
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑞
𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 
 
[equation 5] 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) = ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 + ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞)
+ 𝛾𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 
 
A property of CoVaR is the endogeneity of systemic risk. 
Thus, the CoVaR of each institution is, by its nature, 
endogenous and depends on the risk assumed by other 
institutions in the sample. Therefore, the CoVaR is placed 
as a measure of equilibrium, as it is likely to adapt to 
environmental changes and provide incentives to 
institutions to regulate their own exposure to risk [8,9].  
Finally, the systemic risk, defined by Δ𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖 , for each 
institution comes out the application of the following 
equation: 
 
[equation 6] 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡
 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
= 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
 𝑖(𝑞) − 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
 𝑖(50%) 
 
= ?̂?𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 (𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖(𝑞) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡
 𝑖(50%)) 
 
The significance of the econometric models was evaluated 
using the Wald and likelihood ratio tests. These tests allow 
verifying the significance of the models. 
 
3.2. Limits of VaR and CoVaR metrics to non-financial 
sectors. 
 
Despite the relative maturity of VaR and CoVaR 
applications for risk assessment in the financial sector, this 
approach is not conclusive for others sectors of the 
economy. Challenges to a broaden use of this method are 
generally concerned with the complexity of adapting the 
usual metrics to the peculiarities of other sectors, 
comprehending the characteristics of liquidity, tolerance to 
risk, the channels and speed of contagion, the sample 
limitation, and so on. 
A feature that worthies’ specific attention in this context is 
the diversity of capitalization channels available for some 
sectors. For instance, whenever taking the Brazilian 
telecommunication into account it might be aware that 
major companies are domestic branches of multinational 
organizations which decision to flow in investment is not 
exclusively bound on financial measures. 
Moreover, leveraging the long-term finance available from 
its state-owned development bank (BNDES), has figured as 
the single main provider of infrastructure financing, with 
tax exempt infrastructure bonds. In other words there are 
alternative sources of financing that complement the typical 
flows of investment and eventually might reduce the 
importance of risk indicators formulated from variables 
derived from the financial market. 
Regardless of the specificities, it is categorical that the 
conceptual and technical bases that justify the initiatives for 
risk assessment of financial institutions are similar to those 
of several other sectors. Within the telecommunications 
sector it is possible to distinguish typical characteristics of 
scarcity, service essentiality and high degree of 
interconnection that usually justifies systemic risk analyzes 
in banks, credit providers and financial systems. 
In view of these specificities, it is essential that the 
approach on the subject of risk assessment for non-financial 
sectors develop into specific research. With special 
relevance, efforts must address the reworking of risk 
metrics to the conditions of others sectors and their 
institutions. 
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4. DATA BASE 
 
For the purpose of this study, the dataset are all taken from 
public available sources. References for company 
performance and sample selection are provided by the 
BM&F BOVESPA historical series basis and from the 
companies' annual balance sheets [11]. The sample is a 
well-defined subset of the entire sector, comprehending 
companies with common shares traded on stock exchanges 
and simultaneous operations in the retail and wholesale 
markets of infrastructures. Due to this delimitation, the 
groups Claro S/A and Algar Telecomunicações, among 
other smaller providers, were excluded from the sample. 
The following table summarizes the characteristics of these 
institutions. 
 
Table 1: Sample Summary (Year: 2015, in R$ millions) 
Company 
Total 
Asset 
Value 
(R$) 
% 
Assets 
Sector 
Share 
Net 
Equity 
CAPEX 
Net 
Total 
Debt 
Telefónica 
(VIVT3) 
R$101,6 
32,94% 
R$68,6 R$ 15,3 R$ 4,8 
Oi 
(OIBR3) 
R$97,0 
31,42% 
R$13,2 R$ 13,5 R$ 43,2 
Tim 
(TIMP3) 
R$35,4 
11,47% 
R$16,9 R$ 2,3 R$ 1,2 
Source: BM&F BOVESPA, 2016 e company´s balance sheet. 
 
This data covers daily observations from January 2005 to 
June 2016. The period comprises significate events with 
effects over the entire sector such as the merger between 
Brasil Telecom S/A and Telemar Norte Leste S/A in 2008, 
the acquisition of Vivo by the Telefónica in 2011, the 
acquisition of GVT by Telefónica in 2015, as well as the 
events that preceded the request for judicial recovery of Oi 
in 2016, among others. 
It also includes several periods of economic growth and 
crises. Highlights to the recession triggered by the collapse 
of the US subprime mortgage market in 2008 and the recent 
events of the Brazilian political-economic crisis. Following 
figure 2 resumes the performance of companies' stocks 
during the sample period. 
The data were structured in a panel of daily references for 
returns of the market value of OI (OIBR3), VIVO 
(VIVO3VIVT3) and TIM (TIMP3) shares. Estimates of 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑖  and Δ𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖  are designated by 𝑋𝑖, to the 5% 
quantile. 
Losses references in the returns of the telecommunications 
sector, 𝑋𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚
, were also from the BM&F BOVESPA 
historical series basis. This reference was used as a proxy of 
telecommunications sector performance and comprehends 
the average of the returns of the market value of the sector, 
weighted by the lagged market value. This option follows 
the mainstream literature recommendations [8]. 
Criticisms about this proxy are related to the effects of 
mechanical correlation between institutions performance 
and that for the sector. In order to minimize the possible 
effects of correlation, authors chose to easy the 
preconditions of sample selection and by this mean to 
include in the sample size, for the purpose of sectoral 
performance evaluation, all telecommunications companies 
listed the stock market, regardless of the portfolio of 
services rendered. 
In addition a consistency test was performed to assess 
whether the correlation produces effects on the estimates. 
The test follows the mainstream literature and consists of 
re-estimating the ΔCoVaR of a given institution using the 
system return variables composed by the weighted returns 
of all institutions of the sample, except that for the company 
for which the ΔCoVaR was estimated [9]. 
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Figure 2: Daily stock closing value 
 
Source: BM&F BOVESPA [11] 
Note: The amounts of the common shares of Vivo and Telefónica were chained in such a way as to ensure the consistency of the historical series after the 
period of consolidation of these companies. 
 
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. Results of risk evaluation model 
 
Table 2 resumes the coefficients of regression models. The 
regression models were set for daily data base available for 
OI, VIVO and TIM and spans over 2585 days. The 5% 
quantile corresponds, on average, to observations on the 
129 worst closing results of the organizations in the sample. 
Results for individual (VaR) and systemic risk (ΔCoVaR) 
as well as the ranking of risk indicators are presented in 
Figure 3. Regarding VaR, results suggest that Oi S.A. 
(OIBR3) displays the highest individual risk among the 
companies that make up the sample. Oi's results imply that 
at the 5% quantile there is a probability equal to or greater 
than -9.61% of return losses.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Results of the estimates 
Company 
Equation 3a: 𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑖 
Equation3b:𝑋𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚 = 𝛼𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑋𝑡
𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑡
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
 
?̂?𝒊 ?̂?𝒊 ?̂?𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 ?̂?𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 ?̂?𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 
Telefônica 
(VIVT3) 
-2,313* 0,4925* -5,437** 2,159* 0,1983* 
Oi 
(OIBR3) 
-54,8 -1,717* -10,78* -0,05* 1,3997* 
Tim 
(TIMP3) 
-4,79** 0,5819* -1,568* 2,2796* 0,1059* 
Notes: Wald significance tests and likelihood ratio suggest that the terms of equations 3a and 3b are significant for estimates of the VaR 
and CoVaR models. *, ** denotes significance at 15% and 5%, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Results of VaR and Systemic Risk (ΔCoVaR) for the Brazilian telecommunications market 
Company 𝑽𝒂𝑹𝒒=𝟓% 
Individual Risk 
Ranking  
∆𝑪𝒐𝑽𝒂𝑹𝒒=𝟓𝟎% 
Systemic Risk 
Ranking  
Oi -9,61 1◦ -12,53 1◦ 
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(OIBR3) 
Tim 
(TIMP3) 
-4,20 2◦ -4,56 2◦ 
Telefónica  
(VIVT3) 
-1,82 3◦ -3,07 3◦ 
 
 
Results for ΔCoVaR also point out Oi S.A. (OIBR3) as the 
main source of systemic risk in the telecommunications 
sector. Hence, among the companies in the sample, Oi S.A. 
imposes the largest individual and marginal contribution to 
the sector's systemic risk. 
The findings are consistent with the factual evidence 
observed in the company's performance. Emphasis stands 
on the degree of leverage, the volatility in the value of 
shares and the systematic loss of market value [12, 13]. It is 
important to notice that the span of observations precedes 
the request of judicial recovery posed in June 2016. 
Results for other companies in the sample reveal a relative 
lower risk and systemic risk pattern. Since the sample of 
telecommunications companies with participation in the 
stock market is modest, inferences in this study are only 
relativized between companies in the sample.  
 
5.2. Risk perception in a context of critical demand for 
data driven investment in infrastructure 
 
Availability of modern data oriented networks is a crucial 
component of high-speed Internet access provision. Hence, 
efforts towards the deployment of this infrastructure have 
gained a particular importance within the policy agenda in 
Brazil given the exceptional benefits attached to the 
digitalization of the economy.  
However, there is a downward trend in telecommunications 
investment that is not compatible with the expectations of 
Brazilian policy makers. Such a trend might be related to 
the investor’s perception of risk.  
These circumstances require the development of strategies 
to mitigate risks and to enhance returns for infrastructure 
investment, along with regulatory reforms to easy the flow 
of investments in the sector. 
Initiatives such as the development of risk metrics and the 
comprehension about risk sources and systemic risk 
contagion channels might affect positively the credibility of 
the regulatory action and the establishment of policy 
commitments addressing issues as regulatory stability and 
effective mechanisms for risk mitigation. 
In addition, initiatives towards regulatory reforms with 
inceptives to reduce risk exposure and to facilitate 
investment flows in the sector might create a better 
environment to infrastructure investment, including those 
related to redundancy routes and the construction of 
alternative networks. 
 
5.3. Prudential supervision: initiatives to mitigate 
systemic risk in the telecommunications sector in Brazil 
 
This study provides references for the potentials usages of 
risk indicators such as VaR and CoVaR for the purpose of 
improving governance in the telecommunications sector. 
Particularly, regulatory body might enhance its supervision 
capacity by defining prudential regulation initiatives turned 
to mitigate excessive risk exposure. 
For instance, by including risk metrics in its monitoring 
apparatus regulators would improve its responsiveness to 
eventual crises of credibility caused by one or more 
institutions under stress. 
To be successful, such initiatives require coordination with 
other regulators, in particular the securities and exchange 
authorities, in order to facilitate the sharing of information 
and adequacy of systemic risk methodologies to the 
telecommunications sector. 
Besides, actions towards the promotion of competition in 
infrastructure markets would have particular benefit to 
mitigate sectoral risk. That is why strengthening 
competition in infrastructure provision implies lower 
dependence on dominant infrastructure providers. 
It must also be recognizable that certain political and 
regulatory risks are relevant sources of subjective risks. For 
instance, the risk of maintain the focus on regulation of 
fixed line concessions with rules of assets reversibility or 
actions towards the increasing of taxes on 
telecommunication services might endorse the risk 
perception among investors. Therefore governments may 
also take steps to mitigate compliance risks by electing 
measure of regulatory stability and a positive long term 
approach to easy invest flow in the sector. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article addresses the own individual risk of companies 
and their contribution to the systemic risk of the Brazilian 
telecommunications sector as well as their effects on the 
investors’ perception of risk. 
Results suggest that Oi S.A. displays, simultaneously, the 
highest individual risk and it is the prime diffuser of 
systemic risk in the sector. Since higher risk perception 
imposes greater costs of financing and lower availability of 
funds, by increasing the its risk perception it might be 
expected additional challenge to finance its operation and 
therefore to modernize its infrastructure. Besides, since the 
company holds a significant share in the infrastructures 
supply in the country, it might be expected that eventual 
delay in its infrastructure modernization would impose a 
cascade effect over other sectors. 
These evidences justify the adoption of prudential 
supervision measures in order to create a better governance 
environment towards the sector and by this mean to 
mitigate its exposure to risk perception related costs. To be 
effective it is fundamental to reduce the sources of sectoral 
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risks such as the compliance costs and the current limiting 
rules for investment flow. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of risk assessment in the 
sector it is noticeable that decreasing volume of securities 
issued by telecommunications providers in Brazil in recent 
years, justified by alternative sources of financing, might 
affect estimates like VaR and CoVaR due to  the decreasing 
amount of data availability. It implies that future researches 
on the theme must search for alternative metrics in order to 
get a proper estimate of risk. 
While the present study is by no means an exhaustive 
approach of the risk assessment to the communications 
sector, it is set on a structured the methodological 
discussion so that it has applicability to broader range of 
industries. 
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